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AbstrACt
Introduction Performance-based financing (PBF) has 
acquired increased prominence as a means of reforming 
health system purchasing structures in low-income 
and middle-income countries. A number of impact 
evaluations have noted that PBF often produces mixed 
and heterogeneous effects. Still, little systematic effort 
has been channelled towards understanding what causes 
such heterogeneity, including looking more closely at 
implementation processes.
Methods Our qualitative study aimed at closing this 
gap in knowledge by attempting to unpack the mixed 
and heterogeneous effects detected by the PBF impact 
evaluation in Cameroon to inform further implementation 
as the country scales up the PBF approach. We collected 
data at all levels of the health system (national, district, 
facility) and at the community level, using a mixture of 
in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. We 
combined deductive and inductive analytical techniques 
and applied analyst triangulation.
results Our findings indicate that heterogeneity in 
effects across facilities could be explained by pre-
existing infrastructural weaknesses coupled with rigid 
administrative processes and implementation challenges, 
while heterogeneity across indicators could be explained 
by providers’ practices, privileging services where 
demand-side barriers were less substantive.
Conclusion In light of the country’s commitment 
to scaling up PBF, it follows that substantial efforts 
(particularly entrusting facilities with more financial 
autonomy) should be made to overcome infrastructural 
and demand-side barriers and to smooth implementation 
processes, thus, enabling healthcare providers to use PBF 
resources and management models to a fuller potential.
bACkground
Performance-based financing (PBF) is a 
health financing reform that entails a shift 
in purchasing modalities by introducing a 
transfer of resources to providers based on 
a contract, which defines a bonus payment 
according to a fee-for-service schedule for 
a selected list of services, conditional on a 
measure of quality.1 In the last decade, PBF 
programs have proliferated across many 
low-income and middle-income countries, 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.1 Empir-
ical research has accompanied this growth 
and focused primarily on quantitatively 
assessing PBF’s impact on: health outputs and 
outcomes, patient satisfaction, and the quality 
of service delivery.2–8 Some of these studies 
have shown a positive association between 
PBF and health service coverage or quality, 
but most have uncovered mixed results. 
Recently, as part of an effort to understand 
these mixed results, a number of qualitative 
and mixed-methods studies have emerged 
exploring PBF’s implementation processes9 10; 
Key questions
What is already known about this topic?
 ► A number of impact evaluations of performance-
based financing (PBF) programs have pointed 
to the fact that PBF often produces mixed and 
heterogeneous effects.
 ► Relatively little scientific effort has sought to 
understand how implementation processes affect 
the efficacy of an intervention and can explain the 
observed outcomes.
What are the new findings?
 ► This study represents one of the first attempts 
to use qualitative research to explicitly explain 
heterogeneity in the effects detected by the 
quantitative impact evaluation of a PBF program.
 ► Heterogeneity in the outcomes produced by PBF 
could be attributed both to health systems factors 
hampering the potential of the intervention to 
achieve its set objectives and to the ways individual 
healthcare providers responded to the intervention.
recommendations for policy
 ► Based on our findings, we propose three, broad 
recommendations for policymakers: (1) pay closer 
attention to implementation challenges and 
bottlenecks linked to pre-existing health system 
structures, (2) consider demand-side barriers 
and monitor the potential for PBF to be effectively 
pro-poor and (3) invest in measures to ensure 
greater equity across all districts and facilities.
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providers’ and communities’ perceptions of PBF11 12; 
providers’ incentives, motivation and performance13–15 
and implementation perspectives among national stake-
holders16 or in a cross-country analyses.17 
Gaps remain in understanding why and through which 
mechanisms PBF has (or has not) attained expected 
results or has achieved mixed or heterogeneous results, 
that is, positive results on some indicators or for some 
facilities and areas, yet no impact on or in others. PBF 
proponents and detractors are grappling with ques-
tions about whether the reform’s successes or setbacks 
lie in design or rather in implementation; whether key 
assumptions inherent to PBF (ie, linking payments and 
results, independently verifying results, fostering mana-
gerial autonomy of facilities and so on) are playing out as 
expected; how contextual factors contribute to outcomes 
and whether adjustments could be made to improve 
programmes.18 19
In this paper, we present results of a qualitative study 
that seeks to address a gap in the literature by looking 
specifically at experiences of PBF in Cameroon. Building 
on findings from a quantitative impact evaluation,8 this 
study investigates factors that may explain heterogeneity 
in performance across PBF indicators and facilities. The 
study also explores how providers, managers and commu-
nities perceived the design and rollout of PBF. As several 
low-income and middle-income countries move to scale 
with PBF, evidence and lessons learnt herein will be useful 
to inform implementation well beyond our study setting.
MetHods
study setting
In Cameroon, socioeconomic conditions have deterio-
rated in recent decades and the relative rank of the country 
fell from the 97th place in the 1980 Human Development 
Index to 153rd in 2014.20 Several key millennium devel-
opment goals were not achieved. Under-five mortality, 
maternal mortality and general adult mortality (15–60 
years) were listed, respectively, at 88/1000, 508/100 000 
and 403/1000 in 201521; skilled birth attendance has 
settled at around 60%–65% since the 1990s,22 and HIV 
prevalence (4.5% in 2015) continues to be substantially 
higher than in neighbouring countries.23
With the objective of increasing utilisation and 
improving the quality of health service delivery, the 
Ministry of Health (with financial support from the World 
Bank) in 2011 launched a PBF pilot in the country’s 
Littoral region, followed by a scale-up in 2012 to North-
West, South-West and East regions, covering approx-
imately 500 public, private and faith-based facilities 
(including primary and secondary facilities) across the 
four regions.24 25 The introduction of PBF was facilitated 
by a shift in political discourse favouring the implemen-
tation of more accountable health financing purchasing 
structures.25 Per the design, PBF bonuses were awarded 
for a list of services with a focus on maternal and childcare 
(see online Supplementary additional file 1). Bonuses 
were adjusted for quality of service delivery as deter-
mined based on a quality checklist. PBF payments were 
further adjusted adding an ‘equity bonus’ (a percentage 
of the basic PBF bonus, which varied between regions) 
to address contextual differences (such as remoteness, 
rural location or difficulty in access), which could affect 
service provision. Furthermore, facilities were to provide 
free services to the very poor identified in the commu-
nities and would receive a higher bonus payment from 
the PBF programme for services provided to the very 
poor to account for forgone user fees. PBF facilities filled 
in a monthly activity report, later verified by the ‘fund-
holding agencies’ in collaboration with District Health 
Management teams, based on which payment was made 
monthly. PBF bonuses were paid to facilities, with a 
proportion allocated to health workers (shared using an 
‘indice tool’) and the rest, alongside other incomes from 
user fees and/or budget allocations, used to cover facility 
expenditures (running costs, small investments, etc) as 
decided autonomously and outlined in a quarterly busi-
ness plan prepared jointly by the facility staff.26
An impact evaluation (IE) was carried out between 
mid-2012 and mid-2015 in 14 of 22 districts across three 
of the regions (excluding Littoral). Under the IE, all 
facilities were randomised to receive PBF or one of three 
alternative control interventions, which provided varied 
levels of financial support and supervision not condi-
tional on performance.8
study design
We engaged in an explanatory-exploratory cross-sec-
tional qualitative study,27 which sought explanations 
for patterns observed in the quantitative IE (explan-
atory), but also allowed an open investigation into the 
way PBF was experienced across a range of stakeholders 
(exploratory). During the qualitative study’s prepara-
tion, quantitative results as well as emerging interpreta-
tions and possible directions for qualitative research were 
discussed in depth with stakeholders in Yaoundé. Based 
on these discussions, the team finalised the study design, 
sampling, data collection strategy and tools and identi-
fied key themes to be explored qualitatively.
As highlighted earlier, preliminary results from the 
quantitative IE informed our qualitative work. Similar 
to other contexts, the IE in Cameroon showed that PBF 
produced overall positive changes in service coverage 
for some indicators (eg, maternal and child immunisa-
tion, family planning and HIV testing), but not for others 
(eg, antenatal care, assisted deliveries and child curative 
consultations) and recognised a limited capacity to reach 
the very poor. Looking at quality of care, the IE showed 
that PBF improved the availability of essential inputs and 
equipment, but not service delivery processes, in spite 
of an increased presence of qualified health workers 
and an increased patient satisfaction.8 The programme 
also induced heterogeneity in impact across and within 
districts, with some facilities performing better than 
others.
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data collection
The study team conducted in-depth interviews (IDIs) 
and focus group discussions (FGDs) in order to capture 
perspectives on both the supply (providers and managers) 
and demand side (service users) and to include respond-
ents across health system levels (communities, facilities, 
districts, regional and central levels). Table 1 illustrates 
the sample, data collection instrument and themes 
addressed in each set of interviews. In each region, 
we interviewed health workers in three purposively 
selected primary facilities (a high performer, a delayed 
performer and a low performer) and in one secondary 
facility to ensure representativeness across districts and 
across public and non-public facilities. District medical 
officers (DMOs) were interviewed in the same districts 
and women (service users) in the catchment areas of the 
same sampled facilities.
We completed data collection between December 2016 
and January 2017 with support from trained research 
assistants in collaboration with Centre d’Etudes et de 
Recherches Appliquées en Sciences Sociales (CERASS), using 
semi-structured interview guides, either in English or 
French depending on the region.
data analysis
FGDs and IDIs were recorded, verbatim transcribed in 
the original language (either French or English)and 
coded without further translation. Coding was performed 
in the original language of the interview. French quotes 
included in this paper have been translated, while those 
in English are reported verbatim with no adjustment. 
Coding of the transcripts followed a thematic approach, 
using a mixture of deductive and inductive coding tech-
niques, which is aligned with the explanatory-exploratory 
Table 1 Summary of respondents by level, type, number and instrument used
Level Number and type of respondents
Instrument 
type




 ► Ministry of Health officials: five
 ► Regional delegates: three
 ► Fund-holding agency personnel: three
Total=11
IDI  ► Implementation challenges and solutions 
devised
 ► Role of PBF in shifting operating processes 
within the health system
 ► PBF and facility autonomy
 ► Targeting of the very poor— knowledge, 
applications, challenges
District  ► District Medical Officers (DMOs)→ 
three in each region
Total=9
IDI  ► Changes in work schedule induced by PBF
 ► PBF ability to produce change in service 
coverage
 ► PBF and facility autonomy
 ► Mitigation strategies for challenges induced by 
PBF implementation
 ► PBF and health worker retention
 ► Targeting of the very poor—knowledge, 
applications, challenges
Facility  ► Hospital-based providers: one hospital 
per region→ three staff per hospital 
(family planning, maternity ward, head 
of facility) (total nine)
 ► Health centre-based providers: three 
health centres per region→ two staff 
per health centre (family planning, 
maternal and child services) (total 18)
Total=27
IDI  ► Changes in work schedule induced by PBF
 ► PBF ability to produce change in service 
provision
 ► PBF and facility autonomy
 ► Mitigation strategies for challenges induced by 
PBF implementation
 ► Satisfaction with operational aspects of PBF 
implementation
 ► Mitigation strategies for challenges induced by 
PBF implementation
Community  ► Three FGDs per region with female 
patients and service users
Total=9
 ► Three IDIs per region with women who 
delivered at home (total nine)
 ► Five IDIs per region with women who 
use/do not use FP methods (total 15)
Total=24
IDI and FGD  ► Knowledge, beliefs and practices on specific 
illnesses/services
 ► PBF and care-seeking pathways
 ► Community PBF engagement
 ► PBF and access to care for the very poor
Overall totals IDIs=71
FGDs=9
FGD, focus group discussions; IDI, in-depth interviews; PBF, performance-based financing.
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study design and allowed us to remain faithful to protocol 
and research questions, while remaining open to unex-
pected or unforeseen findings. We applied analyst trian-
gulation (two researchers independently coded the mate-
rial), data triangulation (multiple sources of data) and 
method triangulation (different coding techniques). The 
final interpretation of findings was discussed among all 
authors and with selected key informants closely related 
to PBF implementation in Cameroon.
results
Key findings are displayed to represent (1) views and 
perspectives on PBF, changes and challenges, (2) factors 
that explain heterogeneity in results across selected PBF 
indicators and (3) factors that explain heterogeneity in 
performance across PBF facilities.
Perspectives on PbF
Providers and managers interviewed held positive views 
of PBF and the changes it introduced. Many mentioned 
that PBF ‘encourages us’, it ‘motivates us’, it ‘improves our 
situation’, it ‘helps the facility’, it ‘makes us work hard’, 
and it ‘rewards good work’. The main reasons provided 
to explain the positive accounts concerned the substan-
tial change in the mentality of health workers and in their 
attitude towards work. Health workers reported that the 
requirements of PBF and the standards and tools defined 
in the contracts helped them become more rigorous in 
their work and compelled them to strive for continued, 
collective improvements—as an interviewee said, PBF 
has brought ‘the spirit of getting better’ (DMO). Others 
stressed how PBF gave health workers a sense of direction 
and purpose.
“Now they have improved. If you work well you are going to 
be motivated and it also gives us a sense of direction that is 
very important (…). PBF has made us change our attitude: 
it is good to give your clients good services, which PBF can 
also buy” (Provider, District Hospital).
Individual financial incentives played a key role in the 
narratives of health workers on PBF. Financial incen-
tives for health workers were often referred to simply as 
‘motivation’ (both in English and French) during inter-
views and were seen as a fundamental positive element of 
PBF given incentives’ role in improving the livelihoods 
of health workers, and in particular those who had no 
other formal source of income. Moreover, individual PBF 
bonuses reduced the need for financial coping strategies, 
such as parallel sale of drugs.
To a lesser extent, improvements in the work envi-
ronment (such as improvements in infrastructure and 
equipment, as well as the possibility to recruit additional 
personnel using PBF funds), further bolstered positive 
views. However, it was difficult, and at times impossible for 
many facilities, to address key structural challenges (eg, 
availability of running water and electricity) using PBF 
funds. While such a possibility was foreseen in principle, 
administrative barriers to autonomous decision-making 
(see the description of later findings hereafter) coupled 
with limited funds for low-performing facilities hindered 
capacity to promote substantial infrastructural changes. 
Therefore, structural features remained uneven across 
facilities and districts. Additionally, staff improvements 
were relatively short-lived because delays in PBF payments 
negatively affected the retention of those recruited on 
PBF funds.
Indeed, while the majority of those interviewed agreed 
that overall PBF had enhanced staff satisfaction and moti-
vation and led to better quality of work, many noted that 
these positive effects have been diminishing with time, due 
to challenges related to programme implementation. One 
key concern was delays in PBF payment, which became 
starker after the IE period due to a change in the payment 
processes during the transition from pilot to national 
programmes.28 The prospect of this transition also intro-
duced additional worries, as health workers feared the 
changes in the price attached to the single indicators that 
would follow. Workers and managers mentioned how delays 
demotivated workers, introduced the risk of reverting to 
illegal income-generating practices and created problems 
with staff retention. Moreover, without resources, many 
respondents felt that business plans became an empty 
exercise, while facilities were deprived of the means to 
cover expenditures for services provided to the very poor. 
The enactment of an actual autonomy for facilities was 
another often-mentioned implementation issue. Most of 
the providers interviewed agreed that autonomy existed 
in theory but in practice ‘it’s not respected’, ‘it’s limited’, 
‘it’s only partial’, mostly because of the lack of funds (also 
linked to delays in payment) to realise decisions and make 
autonomy effective. As one respondent described,
“The main thing is that as long as we don’t have funds, 
we cannot manage (…). Well, we start to have a number 
of business plans, but then we cannot follow-up on those 
because we don’t have the money for it” (Provider, District 
Hospital).
Additionally, respondents reported that the autonomy 
in financial management envisaged by PBF largely clashed 
with existing laws regulating financial management at the 
facility level. Specifically, respondents reported that facil-
ities are normally required to return part of their reve-
nues to the central level. Facilities under PBF should in 
principle have been exempted from complying with this 
regulation, allowing them autonomous decision-making 
in financial management. In practice, however, respond-
ents reported not always being able to work according to 
the PBF model, due to pressure to comply with pre-ex-
isting laws. On many occasions, due to pressure to comply 
with national regulations, PBF providers abdicated their 
autonomy in financial decision-making while on other 
occasions, they reported acting autonomously, but ‘with 
a degree of fear’.
Heterogeneity in results across indicators
Our analysis also allows to explore the heterogeneity in 
results across PBF indicators,8 in particular concerning 
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the increase in uptake of vaccination and family planning 
and the absence of change in assisted deliveries. Two 
main, interrelated elements emerged that help explain 
this pattern.
Both providers’ and women’s narratives highlighted a 
change over time with providers becoming more proac-
tive in the delivery of some services, in order to increase 
utilisation and maximise income. Both groups indicated 
that outreach and sensitisation activities (eg, commu-
nity and school visits, establishment of outreach posts or 
family planning sensitisation integrated into antenatal, 
postnatal or child vaccination visits) had become more 
common in recent years. Some said,
“Especially because it is the ‘child completely vaccinated’ 
which are paid for (by PBF), we have to keep doing it, we 
have to increase our outreach activities” (Provider, District 
Hospital).
“In fact, yes (there are more children being vaccinated). 
(…) Now the nurses come to sensitize us, they even knock 
at our doors, ‘mami we are to tchouk (give) vaccines ooo’” 
(woman, South-West region).
This change of practice was focused on services, such as 
family planning and vaccination, which were already free 
and where an increase in coverage could be obtained via 
outreach and sensitisation, while other services (such as 
assisted deliveries) were less of a focus because strate-
gies to increase uptake would have been more difficult 
to implement, especially given demand-side barriers 
(assisted deliveries and antenatal visits are charged a fee). 
Indeed, demand-side barriers emerged as a key factor to 
influence uptake of certain services, as both providers 
and women explained,
“Those who deliver at home do so because of financial 
reasons. It is a monetary issue” (Provider, Health Center, 
South-West region).
“I don’t know anybody that prefers to deliver at home. But 
there are some parents that deliver at home because of lack 
of finance” (woman, North-West region).
Respondents described demand-side barriers to include 
geographical (distance from the facility) barriers as well 
as financial ones, related to both direct costs (fees) and 
indirect costs (transport). Demand-side barriers were 
not explicitly addressed in the PBF programme and they 
would have been more difficult to overcome by providers 
alone. Although a system was in place to ensure and 
improve access to care for the very poor, this was seen 
as ineffective by providers, managers and women. Inter-
views showed that the mechanism was not well known by 
providers, especially lower cadres in primary facilities. 
Additionally, its design and the way the very poor were 
identified varied by region and was described as ‘anar-
chic’ by one respondent, who emphasised that identi-
fying the exceptionally poor was difficult in the absence 
of structured procedures to do so. Finally, delays in the 
payment of PBF bonuses to facilities made it impossible 
to recover the costs of care provided for free to the poor.
Heterogeneity in performance between facilities
We explored the issue of heterogeneity in performance 
between PBF facilities formulating hypotheses and poten-
tial explanations and found that factors influencing 
facility performance extend across three levels: contex-
tual, facility and individual.
First, contextual factors related to the position of 
the facility (eg, rural/urban, ease of access and supply, 
densely populated vs large and sparsely populated area, 
serving a wealthy or poor or mobile population, competi-
tion with other providers and so on), as well as historical 
factors (length of facility’s presence, trust of communi-
ties) seemed to influence the performance of the facility. 
For example, a low performing facility was operating on 
an abandoned industrial site which had a dwindling and 
poor population. In those cases, as one of the respondent 
stressed, it was difficult to achieve high performance, 
while it was easier to do so in more heavily populated 
areas:
“The principal reason is the population in the catchment 
area. The greater the population, the better the perfor-
mance” (DMO).
While the equity bonus in place should have helped 
facilities overcome some of the context-related issues, 
its implementation which was partial and uneven across 
regions may have contributed to the variation in facili-
ties’ performance.
Second, the availability of infrastructure (decent build-
ings, access to water and electricity and so on), mate-
rials and equipment and the presence of qualified staff, 
predating the introduction of PBF, were often mentioned 
to explain a facilities’ performance and constraints. Many 
noted that PBF started without considering the level of 
preparedness of facilities in terms of staff, equipment 
and infrastructure and this led insufficiently equipped 
facilities to struggle. As one district manager said,
“When PBF came, they did not put a level ground. They 
just started, they took health center equal to health center. 
Whether you have one staff, whether you have twenty staff, 
whether you have a microscope, whether you have equip-
ment… ” (DMO).
Finally, factors related to individual health workers’ 
(and in particular facility in-charges’) skills, such as their 
seniority, leadership, management capacity, entrepre-
neurial spirit and their understanding of PBF based on 
PBF-specific training and previous experience in a PBF 
facility, were reported to have an impact on the facility’s 
performance. Heterogeneity in performance was often 
explained in relation to the capacity of single managers 
to make use of the increased, although limited, autonomy 
granted by the programme, to identify effective changes 
in practice, by overcoming the fear to make mistakes. As 
a DMO said,
“(There are) some health facilities in the district that 
have very sharp leadership and with that sharp lead-
ership they can put in place strategies that will lead to 
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better productivity. There are others that their leadership 
is a bit problematic. We have so many health centers that 
have nurse aides as chief of center because the state regis-
tered nurses are not there. We have centers with one staff” 
(DMO).
dIsCussIon
This qualitative study brings together narratives of actors 
from both the health system’s demand and supply side 
that were affected by the introduction of the PBF pilot 
programme in Cameroon. The key findings resonate 
with those from other settings, as they show that overall 
providers and managers held positive views of PBF 
because it changed attitudes towards work, bolstered 
a sense of direction and purpose and rewarded those 
involved with financial incentives.9 11 13 15 29–31 However, 
a series of challenges hampered the capacity to produce 
change to an extent that would have been possible and 
may explain some of the mixed results found in the IE. A 
challenge concerned the limits to facility autonomy and 
the discrepancy between autonomy de jure under PBF 
and de facto.10 Similar to other contexts,9 10 13 15 32 delays 
in PBF payments (although starker after the IE period) 
were a source of frustration and ultimately led to demo-
tivation of health workers and may have had negative 
effects on the programme’s results.
Importantly, this study adds to the existing litera-
ture on PBF as the analysis of providers, managers and 
communities’ perspectives builds on a quantitative IE 
and thus sheds light on the factors explaining the impact 
of PBF (as found in the IE) and outlining causal path-
ways to change. Heterogeneity in results across indicators 
may be explained by the changes in providers’ practice 
(eg, more outreach, greater focus on quality of service 
provision) that focused on services where a substantial 
change in coverage could be obtained at a low cost for 
providers and demand-side barriers were less important. 
This echoes findings from Benin30 and Burundi3 and 
suggests that changes across a wider range of services can 
only be produced if changes in purchasing structures 
are accompanied by measures to remove demand-side 
barriers. Fewer changes were reported in the quality of 
care (eg, women complained about bad reception and 
lack of sufficient explanation of family planning’s side 
effects), which is more complex to obtain. This result is 
in line with the Cameroon IE8 and other studies,7 33 which 
expectedly found that PBF improved structural elements 
of quality of service delivery (eg, equipment and drug 
availability) but not process ones (eg, quality of clinical 
encounter). Furthermore, our findings indicate that 
heterogeneity in facility performance was largely attrib-
utable to the capacity of single managers to executing 
leadership skills, making use of the limited resources 
available and the increased, although constrained, 
autonomy granted to PBF facilities. Additionally, also 
in line with prior evidence from Benin, Tanzania and 
Nigeria,30 34 35 our analysis confirmed that differences in 
performance between facilities may be due to factors at 
contextual, facility and individual levels predating the 
launch of PBF. This seems to suggest that facilities which 
were advantaged for what concerns those factors (and 
therefore likely to be already performing well before the 
introduction of PBF) may have thrived under PBF, while 
worse-off facilities kept struggling and their performance 
improved relatively less, if at all. One can also postulate 
that worse-off facilities are also often the ones caring for 
the poorest populations; hence, they may face an addi-
tional barrier in improving their performance, given the 
additional expectation to provide care for free to the very 
poor. This emerging hypothesis warrants further quanti-
tative research in Cameroon and other contexts.
Methodological considerations
From a methodological perspective, our study adopts a 
novel approach, which builds on an open dialogue with 
concerned policymakers and implementers and looks at 
explaining and exploring meaning behind the effects 
detected by the quantitative IE. While many studies have 
previously used qualitative methods to explore issues 
pertaining to PBF implementation,9 17 32 34 they have not, 
to our knowledge, been explicitly set to explain observed 
heterogeneity in effects. However, our qualitative study 
was not planned ex ante as part of a comprehensive 
mixed-methods study.27 This limited our methodological 
choices in terms of design and data collection and we 
might have missed out on specific opportunities, such as 
engaging in a longitudinal design or better integrating 
quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis. 
Furthermore, the delay between the quantitative and the 
qualitative data collection inevitably affected respond-
ents’ recall. While we were interested only in events 
pertaining to the IE phase, respondents at times strug-
gled to differentiate events having taken place before, 
during or after the IE (eg, delays in payment, changes 
in vaccination practices). In addition, in spite of all due 
precautions we took to this regard (clear semistructured 
interview guide, trained local interviewers with no direct 
relation to the PBF programme, confidential interview 
setting), we cannot exclude the risk, inherent to all social 
research, which respondents at times provided socially 
appropriate answers to fulfil normative expectations.
Policy recommendations
As PBF is further scaled up in Cameroon and as it 
continues to garner considerable buy-in from the 
Ministry of Public Health, this study not only generates 
policy-relevant knowledge that can be used to inform PBF 
rollout in coming years in Cameroon but also highlights 
lessons that are generalisable to PBF in other low-in-
come and middle-income contexts. We advance here a 
few policy recommendations. First, there is a need to pay 
more attention and effectively address implementation 
challenges, such as those causing delays in payment and 
limiting autonomy, which undercut facilities’ capacity to 
generate change and hinder PBF from functioning at its 
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full potential.10 17 32 Second, demand-side barriers (such 
as geographical distance and payments at point of use) 
remain a powerful constraint in increasing the uptake of 
certain services. It would be interesting to test whether 
combining PBF with demand-side incentives, following 
the example of other countries, such as Burundi where 
PBF is implemented in the context of targeted free 
healthcare5 or Malawi where PBF has been coupled 
with conditional cash transfers,36 can produce effective 
changes on a wider range of indicators. This would also 
allow investigating whether PBF has a multiplicative 
effect when coupled with demand-side interventions as 
some suggested.5 Similarly, in line with what documented 
in prior studies,4 37 offering higher reimbursements for 
the care of the very poor does not seem to be enough to 
effectively reach disadvantaged populations and increase 
care among the very poor. Direct investments in targeting 
and in demand-side interventions are needed. Third, 
in order to ensure performance improvements across 
districts and facilities, a better functioning equity bonus, 
streamlined across all areas and including the different 
elements hampering facilities’ performance (including 
size of catchment area, poverty levels as well as remote-
ness) should be in place and it may be also worthwhile 
to provide additional resources to facilities at the start 
of the PBF programme for initial infrastructural and 
personnel upgrades, since in poorly equipped or other-
wise disadvantaged facilities, PBF does not seem to be 
able to generate change to the extent it does in better-off 
facilities.
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